willful obstruction of law enforcement officers

Denny v. State, 222 Ga. App. 21, 660 S.E.2d 886 (2008). WebObstruction of justice is serious offense that both judges and law enforcement officials will not take lightly. 16-5-91(a) and16-10-24(a), defendant had a constitutional right to stand silent during a police officer's questioning; as a result, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for obstruction of an officer based on defendant's silence. Alfred v. Powell, F. Supp. Smith v. LePage, 834 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. Sworn reserve officer with arrest powers was a "law enforcement officer" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. 89 (2017). Because defendant swung at a police officer's face with a loose handcuff and violently struggled during an attempted arrest, the evidence was sufficient to sustain a felony obstruction conviction under O.C.G.A. Daniel v. State, 303 Ga. App. Roberts v. Swain, 126 N.C. App. 20, 2017)(Unpublished). Rev. When an initial stop was lawful and the defendant failed to stop when ordered to do so, there was probable cause to believe O.C.G.A. Man charged with making terroristic WebOverview, and CRS Rept. 659, 574 S.E.2d 880 (2002); Grier v. State, 262 Ga. App. 16-11-39, based on the defendant's yelling obscenities at the officer. WebThe crime of Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer is defined under state law as when a person "willfully hinders, delays, or obstructs any law enforcement officer in the 883, 267 S.E.2d 481 (1980); Duffie v. State, 154 Ga. App. - Evidence that the defendant and another were carrying stolen items toward a police officer's car and that they dropped the items and ran when they realized it was a police car, despite a uniformed officer shouting at them to stop, was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary and obstruction of justice in violation of O.C.G.A. Carter v. State, 188 Ga. App. Dispatcher who reported a crime at a specified location gave police an articulable suspicion to investigate and detain individuals at the scene, particularly because police observations on arriving at the scene corroborated the report. Evidence adduced at trial authorized any rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony obstruction of law enforcement officers in violation of O.C.G.A. Although the evidence was sufficient to show that defendant stalked the victim and obstructed an officer by fleeing in violation of O.C.G.A. The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, substituted the present provisions of subsection (a) for the former provisions, which read: "Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, a person who knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties is guilty of a misdemeanor. 45, 749 S.E.2d 45 (2013). Evidence supported the defendant's conviction for obstruction of an officer as officers shouted to the defendant to show the officers the defendant's hands, but the defendant did not respond. - There was no evidence that the arresting officer assaulted defendant first, but the appellate court concluded that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of obstruction of an officer by refusing to obey the officer's lawful commands and by striking the officer in the face. 16-10-24(a); lying with the intent of misdirecting an officer as to the performance of the officer's official duties can certainly constitute a hindrance and authorize a conviction under that subsection. WebObstructing or Hindering Law Enforcement Officers; Penalty. 675, 516 S.E.2d 537 (1999); Nichols v. State, 238 Ga. App. Evans v. State, 290 Ga. App. Denial of a defendant's motion to suppress was affirmed as the defendant's flight from an improper Terry stop gave the police officers an independent basis to arrest the defendant; the methamphetamine found in close proximity was admissible. In re C. R., 294 Ga. App. 51-7-40. Frayall v. State, 259 Ga. App. 423, 356 S.E.2d 55 (1987); Banks v. State, 187 Ga. App. Boats; fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer. Banta v. State, 281 Ga. 615, 642 S.E.2d 51 (2007). Hamm v. State, 259 Ga. App. 896, 652 S.E.2d 915 (2007). Brown v. State, 320 Ga. App. Officer's testimony that the defendant's heel grazed from the officer's knee cap down the officer's leg to the ankle, leaving a red mark and causing the officer's leg to sting, supported the defendant's conviction for obstruction of a law enforcement officer. GA Code 16-10-24 (2015) What's This? Lightsey v. State, 302 Ga. App. 761, 669 S.E.2d 735 (2008). - County jail corrections officer was acting in the discharge of the officer's lawful duties when the officer repeatedly commanded a defendant to take only one food tray at meal time, when the defendant insisted on taking two trays, and in knocking the trays from the defendant's hands when defendant refused to step out of the line and began eating from one of the trays. Williams v. State, 289 Ga. App. - Defendant officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim because the officer had no arguable probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for misdemeanor obstruction under O.C.G.A. 819, 578 S.E.2d 516 (2003). 291, 638 S.E.2d 430 (2006). 423, 677 S.E.2d 439 (2009). Gordon v. State, 337 Ga. App. In the Interest of M.M., 287 Ga. App. 209, 422 S.E.2d 15, cert. 183, 564 S.E.2d 789 (2002). Strobhert v. State, 241 Ga. App. To consummate an offense of misdemeanor obstruction, some form of knowing and willful opposition to the officer sufficient to constitute obstruction or hindrance is required, but actual violence or threat is not. denied, No. Williams v. Hudson, F.3d (11th Cir. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or the information linked to on the state site. 309, 764 S.E.2d 890 (2014). - Officers who were summoned to the scene of a domestic disturbance and saw defendant forcibly march defendant's family into their dwelling, quite possibly at gunpoint, had probable cause to effectuate a warrantless arrest for a battery constituting a family violence and, thus, were engaged in the performance of official duties for purposes of O.C.G.A. 345, 521 S.E.2d 239 (1999); Russell v. State, 243 Ga. App. 903, 411 S.E.2d 274 (1991); Herren v. State, 201 Ga. App. 155, 679 S.E.2d 380 (2009). 98, 511 S.E.2d 201 (1999). 668, 716 S.E.2d 772 (2011); Foster v. State, 314 Ga. App. Causing harm to or intimidating a juror, witness, or member of law enforcement. 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. When an arrestee allegedly called an officer "a fucking asshole" and was arrested, the officer was properly denied summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to the arrestee's claims under the Fourth Amendment because the officer did not have arguable probable cause to arrest the arrestee for obstructing an officer since the arrestee was within the arrestee's rights to hold the arrestee's arms stiffly because the officer did not have probable cause to arrest the arrestee for disorderly conduct. 664, 678 S.E.2d 128 (2009). Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of attempting to remove a firearm from a police officer in violation of O.C.G.A. Evidence that police responded to a home to investigate a crime after speaking to an injured man, that the officer saw the defendant standing with the defendant's hands concealed in a baggy jacket and instructed the defendant, whom the officer thought might be armed, to display the defendant's hands, and that the defendant failed to comply and attacked the officer supported the defendant's conviction for felony obstruction of an officer. WebThe 2022 Florida Statutes (including Special Session A) 316.1935 Fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer; aggravated fleeing or eluding.. 346, 606 S.E.2d 869 (2004), are disapproved to the extent that these cases imply that misdemeanor obstruction still requires proof of forcible resistance or threats of violence. 16-10-24(a), as defense counsel conceded at trial that the officer's arrest was "legitimate," and no action was taken to suggest otherwise. 464, 373 S.E.2d 277 (1988). Lemarr v. State, 188 Ga. App. Robinson v. State, 288 Ga. App. 688, 385 S.E.2d 772 (1989); Gordon v. State, 199 Ga. App. - Counts of felony obstruction of an officer and misdemeanor obstruction of an officer did not merge; with regard to the felony, the defendant struck and kicked one officer, and with regard to the misdemeanor, the defendant refused to comply with the commands of a second officer. 321, 523 S.E.2d 333 (1999). Stryker v. State, 297 Ga. App. 2007). 16-10-24, prohibiting obstructing or hindering the police, as these statutes did not provide for a civil cause of action; furthermore, the legislature provided statutory civil remedies in the form of false arrest under O.C.G.A. 725 (1915). 16-10-24(b); despite conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact was authorized to resolve the issue of self defense against the juveniles. Appx. United States v. Foskey, F.3d (11th Cir. Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer because the defendant jumped on the officer's back and began choking the officer after the officer, in an effort to avoid being hit, took the defendant's son to the ground and placed a hand on the back of the son's neck; and, as the officer released the son and secured the defendant, the defendant struck the officer twice in the face and once in the neck. 25, 2011). Webwith Intent, Obstruction of Law Enforcement Officer Eric Heath Mims VOP (Agg. After the defendant was lawfully arrested for attempted possession of cocaine, the defendant was not justified in obstructing the police and resisting arrest, and thus the evidence supported the defendant's conviction for misdemeanor obstruction of justice under O.C.G.A. Smith v. State, 258 Ga. App. 378, 532 S.E.2d 137 (2000); Burge v. State, 243 Ga. App. Brown v. State, 163 Ga. App. Owens v. State, 288 Ga. App. 153, 676 S.E.2d 821 (2009). Phillips v. State, 269 Ga. App. 365, 829 S.E.2d 433 (2019). Reynolds v. State, 280 Ga. App. 386, 714 S.E.2d 31 (2011). 2008). For article, "Police Pursuits: A Comprehensive Look at the Broad Spectrum of Police Pursuit Liability and Law," see 57 Mercer L. Rev. Poe v. State, 254 Ga. App. One cannot be guilty of offense of hindering an officer unless that person knew official character of officer. 1998). Force or violence is not an element of misdemeanor obstruction under O.C.G.A. - Evidence supported the defendant's felony conviction for obstruction of an officer under O.C.G.A. In the Interest of D.S., 295 Ga. App. Evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant was guilty of the charge of misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer beyond a reasonable doubt because the officer who first encountered the defendant had a reasonable articulable suspicion to detain the defendant based on a9-1-1 call and dispatch, and when the officer requested that the defendant place the defendant's hands on the officer's vehicle in order to allow the officer to conduct a weapons pat-down, the defendant fled. 16-8-7(a) and defendant violently resisted the arrest; the warrantless arrest was supported by probable cause as: (1) an officer observed defendant banging on and breaking into a coin-operated air compressor in the middle of the night; (2) the officer recognized the air compressor as belonging to a gas station; (3) the officer had seen defendant at the gas station less than 24 hours earlier; and (4) defendant refused to provide information that would verify the claim that defendant had lawfully obtained the compressor. Panzner v. State, 273 Ga. App. Williams v. State, 285 Ga. App. McMullen v. State, 325 Ga. App. Arnold v. State, 315 Ga. App. 493, 677 S.E.2d 680 (2009). - In a lawful arrest based upon probable cause, an officer has the right to use that force reasonably necessary to effect the arrest, and the defendant does not have the right to resist the use of such reasonable force. Consent is not a defense. - Because the defendant decided to pursue an "all or nothing" defense, the trial court did not err in making the decision to not charge the jury on misdemeanor obstruction, sua sponte, as such would have undermined that defense. Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any law enforcement officer, prison guard, jailer, correctional officer, community supervision officer, county or Department of Juvenile Justice juvenile probation officer, probation officer serving pursuant to Article 6 of Chapter 8 of Title 42, or game warden in the lawful discharge of his or her official duties by knowingly and willfully throwing, projecting, or expelling human or animal blood, urine, feces, vomitus, or seminal fluid on or at such individual shall be guilty of a felony and shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than five years.

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